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 A new cross-country database on services policy reveals 
a perverse pattern: many landlocked countries restrict 
trade in the very services that connect them with the 
rest of the world. On average, telecommunications and 
air-transport policies are significantly more restrictive in 
landlocked countries than elsewhere. The phenomenon 
is most starkly visible in Sub-Saharan Africa and is 
associated with lower levels of political accountability. 
This paper finds evidence that these policies lead to 
more concentrated market structures and more limited 
access to services than these countries would otherwise 
have, even after taking into account the influence of 
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geography and incomes, and the possibility that policy 
is endogenous. Even moderate liberalization in these 
sectors could lead to an increase of cellular subscriptions 
by 7 percentage points and a 20-percent increase in 
the number of flights. Policies in other countries, 
industrial and developing alike, also limit competition 
in international transport services. Hence, “trade-
facilitating” investments under various “aid-for-trade” 
initiatives are likely to earn a low return unless they are 
accompanied by meaningful reform in these services 
sectors. 
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1.  Introduction 
Landlocked countries are seen as victims of geography, insulated from beneficial flows of trade, tourism 
and  knowledge.  But  are  these  countries  choosing  policies  to  offset  the  handicap  of  location  and 
improve connectivity with the rest of the world?  Surprisingly, many are not.  Drawing upon a new 
services policy database, we show that the policies of landlocked countries in key “linking” services like 
transport and telecommunications are on average significantly more restrictive than elsewhere.  We 
also show that these policies lead to more concentrated market structures and more limited access to 
services  than  these  countries  would  otherwise  have,  even  taking  into  account  the  constraining 
influences of geography and low incomes, and the possibility that policies are endogenous.   
To motivate the analysis, consider three landlocked countries, Laos, Nepal and Zambia, on which we 
provide more detailed information in Section 2.  In terms of policy, each country has  at least until 
recently stifled competition in telecommunications – primarily by restricting the conditions for new 
entry – and in air transport – primarily by negotiating restrictive BASAs on key routes.  In terms of access 
and quality of services, each of the three countries fairs poorly.  In, Nepal the number of telephone 
mainlines per 100 people is 2.5, half the regional average for South Asia; in Laos 1.5, one-seventh the 
regional average for East Asia; and in Zambia 0.75, one-fourth of the regional average for Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  In mobile telephony, the gaps are slightly less stark but still significant; for example, Nepal had a 
mobile teledensity (subscriptions per 100 people) of 12, which is about one-third of the South Asian 
regional average.  In terms of lead time to import and export, in all three countries goods move slowly 
compared to their respective regional averages.  For example, in Laos, shipments take twice as long for 
the average East Asian country (50 vs 25 days).  The World Bank’s logistics performance index for the 
quality of logistics services is also below the regional average in all three countries.   
Can concentrated markets and poor performance be attributed to poor policy?  Or are they primarily 
attributable to other disadvantages?  It is not easy to provide a convincing answer to these questions 
because the policy information we have collected is only for a single time period, making it difficult to 
control for all the possible sources of heterogeneous performance across countries.  Nevertheless, we 
are able to control for the most likely determinants of poor performance: the adverse influences of 
geography  and  low  incomes.    We  also  address  the  possibility  that  policy  itself  is  endogenously 
determined – e.g. through successful lobbying for protection by concentrated industries – by using an 
instrumental variable strategy that relies on the association between poor policy and weak governance. 
Using these strategies, we show that there is evidence that poor policies lead to more concentrated 
market structures and more limited access to services than these countries would otherwise have.  At 
this stage, we seek primarily to document the unexpected patterns of policy, and demonstrate, to the 
limited extent allowed by available data, that these patterns matter. 
The policies of landlocked countries are not the only problem.  In international transport, it takes two to 
liberalize.  Zambia cannot unilaterally introduce greater competition on the Lusaka-London or Lusaka-
Johannesburg air routes.  Both the United Kingdom and South Africa also need to agree to allow entry 
by third country airlines on each route.  Our database shows that industrial and developing country 3 
 
policies in international transport tend to be more restrictive than in other services sectors.  Traffic on 
many air routes continues to be subject to restrictive bilateral air service agreements (BASAs) that 
fragment  the  international  market  into  a  series  of  route-specific  duopolies.    Ironically,  industrial 
countries that are willing to provide “aid for trade” to landlocked countries to improve their ports, 
airports and customs, neither seek nor initiate the liberalization of air transport services that would 
greatly enhance the impact of this aid. 
Previous  studies  have  looked  at  possible  reasons  for  the  transport  sector’s  poor  performance  in 
landlocked countries.  Limao and Venables (2001) highlight the effect of infrastructure on landlocked 
countries’ trade costs and trade flows but do not consider policy choices.  Other studies recognize the 
role of policy, particularly in trucking.  Raballand and Macchi (2009) find that market regulation is a 
critical determinant of the price of trucking services, while market access restrictions and freight sharing 
schemes hinder competitiveness and raise trade costs especially for landlocked countries of Africa. The 
paper  suggests  that  the  donor  community  should  support  transport  market  liberalization  because 
investments in roads alone would not reduce the cost of transportation for end-users.  Indeed, Hallaert 
et al. (2011) do not find domestic transportation infrastructure to be an important determinant of 
landlocked countries’ trade performance, pointing instead to the importance of regulatory issues in the 
transport sector.   Arvis, Raballand and Marteau (2010) discuss not only the trucking regulations in 
landlocked countries but draw attention to the fact that corresponding regulations in transit countries 
are also essential to reducing the cost of trade.  Raballand, Kunaka and Giersing (2008) argue that 
regional liberalization of trucking services in Southern Africa has had an important effect on transport 
costs  and  tariffs  for  Zambia.    Lall,  Wang,  and  Munthali  (2009)  demonstrate  that  both  improved 
infrastructure and increased competition among transport service providers are important in lowering 
transport cost in Malawi, another landlocked country in Africa.  
The present study builds on this earlier work but is broader in scope, both in terms of the range of 
countries and types of sectors and policies covered.  We focus on air transport and telecommunications, 
both because they are vital for connectivity, but also because landlocked countries have a smaller if any 
inherent disadvantage in these services. While previous studies acknowledge the importance of market 
structure,  this  paper  adds  to  that  literature  by  illustrating  how  specific  policies  contribute  to  a 
concentrated market structure. The dominant trend in trade facilitation projects under the new “aid for 
trade” initiatives is increased investment in infrastructure, but this paper shows how such investments 
alone will yield a low return if policies that restrict competition among service providers remain in place.  
 
2.  Policy data and patterns 
A  range  of  services  link  a  country  to  the  rest  of  the  world.    We  focus  on  air  transport  and 
telecommunications, first,  because they are vital for connectivity.  Second, the availability of these 
services is influenced at least in part by landlocked countries own policies, rather than just geography.  
Third, better policy data is available for these services than for other relevant services sectors, such as 
road transport.  4 
 
We focus on policies that affect market structure, particularly by influencing foreign entry.  The policy 
data come from a new World Bank project that has for the first time compiled data on actual or applied 
policies affecting foreign presence in a number of services sectors.
1  Thanks to this database it is possible 
to investigate the implications of differences in services policies across sectors and countries.
2  In the 
telecommunications sector, relevant policies include limits on the number of licenses issued, restrictions 
on the extent of foreign ownership in firms, nationality requirement for board of directors, restrictions 
on establishing an international gateway (IG) and the use of voice over IP (VOIP) technology.  In the air 
transport sector, relevant policies include not just  those  affecting the ability of foreign airlines to 
establish a local commercial presence, but also the bilateral air service agreements (BASAs) that govern 
international transport.  To capture the restrictiveness of BASAs, we draw on the  WTO’s “Quantitative 
Air Services Agreements Review”(QUASAR) database which represents the most comprehensive source 
currently available on bilateral air services agreements, covering over 2,000 such agreements.  
2.1  A qualitative picture of policy in selected countries 
To provide a country-face to the subsequent empirical analysis, consider examples of the policies of 
three landlocked countries:  Nepal, Laos and Zambia
3.  In telecommunications, as much of the world is 
being transformed by the interplay between competition and new technologies, each of these countries 
has stifled competition in its own unique way. Nepal granted exclusive licenses in the fixed line segment 
until 2009 to United Telecommunications Limited (with majority Indian Government ownership) and in 
mobile to Spice Telecom ( with  majority Kazakh ownership), effectively  creating  duopolies  in each 
segment between these firms and the state-owned firm.  Zambia set a prohibitively high license fee ($12 
million) for establishing an independent   international gateway market (IGW) , in order to give the 
incumbent  state-owned  operator,  Zamtel,  a  de  facto  monopoly  in  the  international  segment.
4  
Monopoly profits enabled Zamtel to inhibit competition in other segments of the market through cross-
subsidization rather than to finance expansion of the rural network. In Laos, new entry is possible only 
through direct negotiation with the government, and to date  the government has in all cases reserved 
its right to be a partial owner of the new undertakings (Millicom, Shinawatra, Sky Communications and 
Veittel). In each of these countries, the regulatory authority is not really independent and is widely 
reported to favor state-owned incumbent operators.  For example, in Laos, since the regulator was 
                                                           
1 The main sectors are financial, telecommunications, retailing, transportation, and professional services sectors, further 
disaggregated into banking (retail), insurance (life, non-life, and reinsurance), road freight transport, railway freight, maritime 
shipping and auxiliary services, air transport (freight and passengers), accounting, auditing, and legal services. 
2 To date surveys have been conducted in 78 developing and transition countries and comparable information obtained for 24 
OECD countries.  Among the countries covered in the paper, only Laos was not covered by the survey, and the data for Laos 
came from a country study by one of the authors.  In an effort to ensure data accuracy, the policy information was subjected to 
review by government officials, which led to a confirmation and/or update of the data for most of the OECD countries and a 
number of developing countries. The country coverage is representative of all world regions and income levels.   
3 For an in-depth study of services sectors in Zambia, see Mattoo and Payton (2007). 
4 This license fee has recently been reduced. 5 
 
unable or unwilling to induce the incumbent firm to share its fiber-optic “backbone” cable with rival 
firms, one of them has chosen to create at significant cost a parallel fiber-optic backbone. 
In air transport, the restrictions are less original, and resemble the pattern in the rest of the world.  In 
Laos, the government-owned airline, Lao Aviation, has a quasi-monopoly on the domestic air transport 
market, and the only competition comes from a privately-owned helicopter-charter service, which is 
used to reach remote areas. On international routes, Lao Aviation operates flights covered by a series of 
restrictive bilateral air service agreements (BASAs) on routes to their respective countries with Thai 
Airways International, Viet Nam Airlines, and China (Yunnan) Airlines.  For example, the agreement with 
Thailand limits capacity on the vital Bangkok-Vientiane route to 2,100 seats per week. Nepal Airlines, 
plagued by poor management and political interference, has seen its financial situation weakened and 
its fleet shrunk to two Boeing 757s and four twin otters.  By virtue of being the designated airline, it 
occupies crucial space in BASAs, which it is incapable of exploiting.  One of the key hubs is Delhi, where 
the number of seats is limited to 6000 per week for each side, but Nepal Airlines uses only 1,300 seats of 
the Nepali quota.  Japan has refused to grant fifth freedom rights on the Kathmandu-Shanghai-Osaka 
route, and China may be restricting flights on the Kathmandu-Lhasa route.  
Zambia’s  case  has  broader  significance  because  it  is  part  of  a  regional  agreement  that  ostensibly 
liberalized air transport and is one of the rare countries that allowed its loss-making national airline to 
be liquidated, in the mid-1990s.  The implementation of up to Fifth Freedom liberalization in the African 
Union was agreed in the Yamoussoukro Decision (YD) which became fully binding in 2002.  However, 
years later, the Agreement has had little impact on Zambia and its neighbors.  Given the failure of YD, 
the  Common  Market  for  Eastern  and  Southern  Africa  (COMESA)  agreed  to  liberalize  air  transport 
services among its member states with regulations and a mechanism similar to the YD.  But here too 
implementation  has  been  partial  at  best.    As  a  consequence,  Zambia’s  international  air  transport 
remains based on restrictive bilateral air service agreements (BASA).  Schlumberger (2007) has shown 
how both Zambia and South Africa have in the past denied Fifth Freedom rights to other countries.
5  
Another policy aspect inhibiting Zambia’s air connectivity are jet fuel prices which are reported to be 
about 50 percent higher in Lusaka than in neighboring countries (see Schlumberger 2007, p. 192). 
2.2  Quantification of survey policy information 
The  techniques  used  to  measure  barriers  to  services  trade  are  still  relatively  primitive.
6  Existing 
estimation  methods  range  from  simple counts  of  restrictive  policies  to more  complex  weighted 
averages, where weights reflect prior assessments of the relatively restrictiveness of specific policy 
                                                           
5 Even though Zambia no longer has a national airline, it has denied Fifth Freedom rights to Ethiopia to fly the Addis Ababa-
Lusaka-Johannesburg route, to Nigeria on the Lagos-Lusaka-Johannesburg route, and to Kenya on the Nairobi-Lusaka-Harare 
route.  At the same time South Africa, keen to protect its national airline’s interests on routes between Zambia and South 
Africa, has also denied Fifth Freedom rights to other countries like Egypt to fly the vital Cairo-Lusaka-Johannesburg route. 
6 Non-tariff barriers, which are pervasive in services, have proved hard to measure even in goods trade.  Existing methods in 
goods rely on inferring restrictiveness on the basis of the impact on trade flows (Kee, Nicita and Olarreaga 2009), but the 
absence of disaggregated services trade data especially for developing countries rules out such techniques.   6 
 
barriers. There is, however, a potentially serious problem with methods that treat all restrictions (entry, 
operational, regulatory) as additive.  For instance, if foreign suppliers are not allowed to enter in the first 
place, then the restrictions on operations and regulatory environment simply do not matter.  Similarly, a 
foreign equity limit of 49 percent already precludes foreign corporate control and so adding to it a 
further (frequently encountered) requirement that the majority of board of directors be nationals would 
amount to double counting. 
It seems more appropriate econometrically to estimate the restrictiveness of policies based on their 
impact on some outcome variable – such as the price of the service (Fink et al., 2002).  Where feasible, 
several  policy  variables  could  be  included  separately  as  explanatory  variables,  either  as  directly 
measured (e.g. the number of licenses or the percentage share of foreign ownership allowed) or as a 
binary indicator variable (e.g. whether voice over internet protocol is allowed).  The impact on the 
outcome variable, controlling for other non-policy influences, then serves as a means of comparing the 
relative impact of different policies.  The use of such techniques depends on whether the number of 
observations is large enough to accommodate the range of policy variables being considered, whether 
policies can be represented quantitatively, whether relevant outcomes can be measured and whether 
the required data are available. 
We choose to use a combination of methods.  To the extent feasible, we assess the impact of policy 
variables individually in ordinary least squares regressions.  However, it is also useful to construct a 
single  measure  of  overall  openness  in  specific  sectors  to  facilitate  graphic  depiction,  but  more 
importantly to conserve degrees of freedom in estimation and to address concerns about the possible 
endogeneity of policy.  The measure of openness we construct is relatively transparent and avoids the 
pitfalls of the additive approaches mentioned above.  Essentially, we assess policy regimes in their 
entirety  and  assign  them  into  five  broad  categories:  completely  open,  i.e.  no  restrictions  at  all; 
completely closed, i.e. no entry allowed at all; virtually open but with minor restrictions; virtually closed 
but with very limited opportunities to enter and operate; and a final residual “middle” category of 
regimes which allow entry and operations but impose restrictions that are neither trivial nor virtually 
prohibitive.  We either represent each of these regimes by a dummy variable, or when required for 
graphic  illustration  or  instrumental  variable  estimation,  the  regimes  are  assigned  a  services  trade 
restrictiveness index (STRI) on an openness scale from 0 to 1 with intervals of 0.25.  When two or more 
measures are in place, the  regime assignment reflects the overall restrictiveness of the measures.
7  
More details about the methodology can be found in Borchert et al. (2011). 
For  cross-border trade in  air transport, we used the Air  Liberalization  Index (ALI)  of the QUASAR 
database,  created by the WTO Secretariat. The ALI ranges from 0 to 50 with zero being the most 
restrictive. The ALI is calculated by selecting the provisions of bilateral ASAs de emed to be particularly 
                                                           
7 Measures covered can be divided in two tiers.  The first tier measures include those that affect market entry decisions most 
significantly, such as the limit on foreign ownership and the number of licenses allowed. The second tier measures are those 
that affect operations of service providers, such as the board of directors and repatriation of earnings etc. If the first tier 
measures are prohibitive, the second tier measures are not considered.  But if the first tier measures are not prohibitive, then 
the second tier measures are also considered to determine of overall restrictiveness. 7 
 
important  for  market  access  and  assigning  a  score  between  zero  (most  restrictive)  and  8  (least 
restrictive) to each restriction. These scores are then averaged in consultation with a group of experts, 
using weights intended to reflect the relative importance of each restriction.  The scores attributed can 
also be altered to take into account the specific situation of a country pair, in particular by giving more 
weight to: fifth freedom traffic rights (e.g. for geographically remote countries such as Australia and 
New Zealand);  withholding, in particular, community of interest and principal place of business; and 
multiple designation. For comparability, the scale of ALI is converted to the STRI scale.
8   
We recognize the subjectivity of our approach.  Yet there is no obviously superior, feasible method of 
quantification.
9  The subjectivity is somewhat mitigated by the extensive  consultations we have 
conducted with the private sector and regulators to mak e the assignments to specific categories.  We 
also  checked  the  robustness  of  the  assignments  by  moving  border -line  policies  regimes  across 
categories.  We believe that the adopted approach  is better equipped than any fixed algorithm to turn 
the rich and di fficult-to-quantify aspects of policy information into  broadly plausible restrictiveness 
scores.  In Krugman’s words, it has the virtue of being “roughly right rather than precisely wrong.” 
2.3  The patterns of policy 
Figure  1 compares  the  average  overall  Services Trade  Restrictiveness  Index  (STRI) of 22  landlocked 
countries
10 to the average STRI of non-landlocked countries.  The STRI ranges from 0 (fully open) to 100 
(sector closed to foreign entry).
11  In both sectors the average restrictiveness index for la ndlocked 
countries is significantly higher as compared to average restrictiveness in coastal  countries.  The gap is 
larger in telecommunications than  in air transport, reflecting the fact that the rest of the world has 
moved faster to liberalize telecommunications than air transport. 
Within the air transport, the difference is primarily driven by considerably tougher policies on cross -
border trade of air transport services  in landlocked countries.  In fact, policies governing commercial 
presence  in  air  tran sport  are  slightly  more  liberal   in  landlocked  countries  ( STRI  of  32  vs  39).  
Nonetheless, foreign investors might not be able to take advantage of the relative openness in Mode 3 
(FDI) due to the withholding and designation provisions of the Bilateral Air Services Agreements (BASAs).  
More specifically, the designation policy of BASAs allows countries to designate one or more airlines to 
                                                           
8  ALI values are first sorted to increase in restrictiveness, divided into quartiles, and countries within each quartile are then 
associated with STRI scores equal to 0, 25, 50 and 75, respectively.  In Figure 1 presenting the overall STRI in air transport, the 
STRI for cross-border trade (BASAs) is combined with the STRI for commercial presence using a weight of 0.7 and 0.3, 
respectively, because cross-border supply is the primary mode of supply for air transport. 
9  Notice that when the goal is to demonstrate how policies matter for outcome variables of interest, as we endeavor in this 
paper, the restrictiveness of certain measures cannot be quantified econometrically in a first step by estimating their effect on 
some outcome variable.  In this case, the restrictiveness score needs to be exogenous and must not be derived in a way that 
involves the quantity to be explained. 
10  The 22 landlocked countries, grouped by region, are: Africa – Botswana, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mali, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe;  Asia – Mongolia, Nepal, and Lao, PDR;  Eastern and Central Asia – Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Uzbekistan;  Latin America – Bolivia, Paraguay;  OECD – Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary. 
11 Later in regression analysis, the scores are in decimals. In the figure, these decimal indices are multiplied by 100. 8 
 
exercise the right to operate the agreed air services. In most developing countries, the designated 
airlines are the state-owned incumbents.  The withholding policy specifies the ownership conditions for 
the designated airlines of the other party.  In the majority of countries, the withholding rights require 
substantial ownership and effective control by the nationals of the designated party.  Hence, liberal FDI 
policies  regarding  the  establishment  of,  say,  a  majority-owned  subsidiary  by  a  foreign  airline  have 
limited impact if this affiliate company is prevented from offering international services.  
Figure 1:  Overall STRI for Air Transport and Telecommunications 
 
Note:  Air transport comprises mode 1 and mode 3 and telecom comprises fixed and mobile telecom; 
  The difference in means is significant at the 5 percent level in both sectors. 
Within the telecom sector, policies applied by landlocked countries to the fixed line segment are more 
restrictive than those governing mobile telephony.  This feature of policy is shared with most other 
countries, especially in Africa where the ‘mobile revolution’ emerged as a way to bypass the stalemate 
in the fixed line sector.  For example, in Zambia and Belarus a state-owned monopolist provides fixed 
line services but in both countries the mobile market is at least partially open to foreign investment.  
However, within both sub-sectors landlocked countries have markedly more restrictive policies in place.  
The wedge is slightly higher in fixed line, where the average STRI is 43 in landlocked countries and 27 for 
other countries, than in mobile telecom, where averages are 35 and 23, respectively.  Annex 3 and 




















3.  The political economy of services policies 
Before proceeding to the empirical analysis of how (and how much) policy measures affect outcome 
variables of interest, we wish to better understand the factors underlying policy choices; in particular, 
we propose a theoretical rationale for the stylized fact that, on average, landlocked countries choose to 
adopt  more  restrictive  policies  than  coastal  countries.  This  section  also  creates  the  basis  for  our 
empirical analysis. 
We begin by adding a political economy dimension to an otherwise standard oligopoly model in which 
suppliers compete in quantities to provide a homogenous service.  The key modification consists of 
relaxing the assumption that the government maximizes the ‘social surplus,’ in which equal weights are 
attached to consumer surplus and profits.  Instead, we explicitly allow for the government to attach a 
higher  weight  to  profits,  as  in  the  well-known  Grossman  Helpman  framework.
12  We assume that, 
through policy measures such as license limits, the government is able to directly control the number of 
active providers in the market, but the price and quantities are determined by the market.
13  We will use 
this model to show how the optimal number of providers the government would want to allow in the 
market depends on country characteristics.   
Let Q=(q) denote aggregate output, P(Q) the inverse demand function, C(q) a provider’s cost function, 
CS consumer surplus and  profits, W(n,q) the government’s objective function,  the relative weight 
attached to profits, n the number of providers, and  the price elasticity of demand.  In addition, we 
make the following assumptions: 
(A1)  The inverse demand function satisfies P’(Q) < 0 for all Q > 0. 
(A2)  (i) The cost function is the same for all firms, Ci(q) = C(q), and satisfies C’(q) > 0 and C’’(q) > 0.
14  
(ii) The average cost schedule, AC(q) = C(q)/q, is downward sloping and thus satisfies AC’(q) < 0. 
(A3)    A  provider’s  marginal  revenue  must  not  rise  with  its  rivals’  output,  i.e.  
∂
2/∂qi∂qj = P’(Q) + qiP’’(Q) < 0 (the Hahn condition).
15  P’’(Q) < 0 for all Q, i.e. a concave demand 
function, is sufficient for the Hahn condition to hold with strict inequality. 
                                                           
12  We adopt a notation that puts a relative weight on profits because the socially efficient outcome in an oligopoly model, 
which is a natural starting point for our analysis, would set profits to zero so that there is no point in attaching any non-
degenerate weight to consumer surplus without violating the firms’ financial viability constraint. 
13 Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) have also focused on the number of firms but studied the “excess entry theorem” under 
alternative pricing conditions rather than the government’s optimal choice.  Zhao (2009) explores necessary and sufficient 
conditions regarding cost functions under which a social planer’s search for the optimal number of firms will yield an interior 
solution.  This work highlights the important role of scale economies in shaping the social welfare function but does not explore 
deviations from a set of equal weights on consumer surplus and profits. 
14 The latter condition C’’(q) > 0 is stronger than necessary and may be replaced by the weaker assumption that the marginal 
cost schedule decrease, if ever it does, at a slower rate than the perceived demand curve, i.e. P’(Q) – C’’(q) < 0.   
15 This assumption ensures that providers’ reaction curves are downward sloping and thus rules out “strategic 
complementarity” (Shapiro 1989, p.337). 10 
 
(A4)  A symmetric equilibrium uniquely exists and is defined as a triplet of q*(n), Q*(n) and P*(Q), 
with Q(n)=nq(n) and P(nq*) + q*P’(Q*) – C’(q*) = 0. 
(A5)  (i) The inverse demand elasticity  can be written as   P’(Q)Q/P = 1/.
16  (ii) The demand 
elasticity  is bounded from above according to    
     
     .  
The government’s objective function, W(n,q), is a weighted average of consumer surplus and profits.  
With oligopolistic pricing, the government will take into account that in equilibrium q(n) will adjust to 
the number of providers.  Thus the government will maximize the following objective function with 
respect to n: 
                                 
     
 
                                            
Setting W’(n) = 0 leads to the following first-order condition 
                                                                          
The first-order condition also includes the indirect effect of n through induced output changes,       , 
which is negative, i.e. firm output falls when more providers are allowed to enter the market.  As in Zhao 
(2009),        can be compactly expressed as a function of                      and            
      , both of which are strictly negative (see Annex 1 for full details).  Making use of this simplification 
and rearranging yields the optimality condition for the number of firms  
             
  
            
   
     
    
   
 
             
In addition, we may define the factor of proportionality which depends on the country characteristics   
and  : 
        
  
            
 
Notice that when the relative weight on profits,  = 1, this factor of proportionality is reduced to unity.  
However, with  > 1 (and   negative) it is easily verified that        > 1, demonstrating how the added 
weight on profits drives a wedge between price and marginal cost.  Using this notation, and recalling 
that C(q*)/q* denotes average cost (AC), the optimal number of providers, n*, is the fixed point of this 
optimality condition that expresses price as a function of average costs: 
                        
     
    
 
 
             
                                                           
16 Shapiro (1989, p.334) assumes this to hold without further qualification but the second equality is only satisfied when the 
inverse of the first derivative of the demand function equals the first derivate of the inverse.  Let Q = f(P), then we must have 
that 1/f’(P) = *f-1(P)+’.  This condition is satisfied, for instance, for the class of constant elasticity of demand functions. 11 
 
 
Against the benchmark of the efficient outcome, i.e. price equal to average cost, this condition reveals 
two principle sources of inefficiency.  First, the term in squared brackets exceeds average costs due to 
oligopolistic  pricing  on  the  part  of  the  firms  (             because  Assumption  A2(ii)  requires  the 
average cost schedule to be downward sloping
17). Secondly, this expression is then multiplied by a factor 
       which captures the influence of country characteristics.  That is, in addition to the distortion 
introduced by strategic interaction, the government will find it optimal to admit an even lower number 
of firms as        widens the wedge between price and average cost.
18  Recall that the effect exerted by 
the demand elasticity disappears only in the special case of equal weights given to consumer surplus and 
profits.  Since there is no particular reason to believe that this  is case in reality, the general prediction 
delivered by this model may be useful for empirical work.  Notice that the relationship between both 
effects—oligopolistic behavior and country characteristics—is not additive but rather multiplicative.  As 
a  result,  we  find  that  the  adverse  effect of  less elastic  demand  and  less  welfare-oriented  decision 
makers on the optimal number of providers is amplified by the strategic interaction typically prevalent in 
oligopolistic markets.   
We are particularly interested in the way in which the parameters   and   affect the government’s 
choice of n.  The factor        will be higher in countries in which the demand for the service under 
consideration is less elastic (         , recall   is negative), whereas for any given demand elasticity, a 
stronger government weight on rents will also increase the factor of proportionality (         ); for 
details see Annex 1.  In both cases the implication is a lower optimal number of providers.  In order to 
derive the main result of this section, totally differentiate the optimality condition to obtain 
   
  
  
              
      
             
     
          
      
   
  
  
              
      
             
     
          
      
      
    
  
      
      
             
                   
 
           
      
                                                           
17  See Zhao (2009).  The presence of economies of scale is a necessary condition for obtaining an interior solution on n*.  To 
see this, consider the two corner solutions: under constant or diseconomies of scale overall welfare always improves as the 
number of providers grows large, whereas under strong economies of scale welfare is maximized by having production 
concentrated in a single firm. 
18  It has long been recognized that the standard Cournot oligopoly equilibrium, in which there are likewise positive profits, can 
conversely be seen as the outcome attained by a social planer which maximizes an aggregate welfare function in which profits 
are valued relatively more than consumer surplus (Bergstrom and Varian 1985).   12 
 
Given Assumptions (A1)—(A5), the optimal number of providers is lower in markets characterized by 
more inelastic demand for the service under consideration.  The optimal number of providers is also 
lower in countries in which the government attaches a higher relative weight to providers’ aggregate 
profit compared to consumer surplus.  Lastly, examining the cross-derivative reveals again how the two 
parameters  reinforce  each  other  in  determining  the  government’s  choice.   Specifically,  the  optimal 
number of providers shrinks more rapidly with lower demand elasticity the less welfare-oriented the 
government.   
 
4.  Market structure and performance – An econometric analysis 
Having described the incidence of services policy measures across countries, with a particular focus on 
landlocked  countries’  policy  choices,  we  now  investigate  whether  policy  restrictiveness  matters  for 
market structure and performance in the telecommunication and transportation sector, respectively.  
The effects of services policy measures are not well studied especially in developing countries due to the 
scarcity of data on policy restrictiveness.  One of the few studies to venture into this area is Fink et al. 
(2003)  who  analyze  the  impact  of  policy  reform  in  basic  telecommunications  across  86  developing 
countries  and  find  that  both  privatization  and  competition  lead  to  significant  improvements  in 
performance.
19  However, as far as we know, previous studies have not addressed the possibility that 
services policy in endogenous.  In Sectio n 4.1, we discuss a possible approach to this problem, which 
then provides the basis for the econometric analyses in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. 
4.1 Addressing the possible endogeneity of policy 
Trade  openness  is  unlikely  to  be  an  exogenous  variable;  in  particular,  standard  political  economy 
arguments would suggest that policy choices depend at least in part on local market structure and the 
sector’s performance, precisely the aspects we seek to explain.  For instance, supplier concentration 
confers political clout that can be used to resist liberalization which would dissipate the rents emanating 
from the incumbents’ market power.
 20  To the extent that these rents can be shared with policy makers, 
                                                           
19  A study by the OECD (2009) is closest to ours, finding that countries’ restrictiveness in telecommunications, as measured by 
a similar index, significantly impedes inward foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as domestic sales by foreign affiliates (FATS).  
Some studies provide index-type descriptive evidence on regulatory barriers in the telecom sector but do not proceed to a 
quantitative impact analysis, e.g. Holmes and Hardin (2000) on APEC countries, Koyama and Golub (2006) on OECD and 13 non-
OECD countries, Marouani and Munro (2009) on Egypt, Jordan and Morocco, and Golub (2009) on 73 developing and developed 
countries across the globe.  The latter focuses on a narrower definition of restrictiveness (only barriers to FDI) but 
demonstrates how FDI per capita decreases as the FDI restrictions index increases. 
20  There is empirical evidence (Goldberg and Maggi 1999, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000) that policy makers respond to 
pressures by granting protection in sectors with low demand elasticities, implying that sectors receive higher protection when 
there are fewer opportunities for consumers to substitute away.  This might provide one rationale for policies being more 
restrictive in landlocked countries because demand e.g. for transportation services is less elastic due to the absence of maritime 
shipping as an alternative mode of transportation. 13 
 
as the `protection for sale’ literature assumes (Grossman and Helpman 1994), an oligopolistic market 
structure ceteris paribus provides incentives for retaining a more restrictive policy stance.
21   
The theoretical analysis above suggests that the restrictiveness of policy can be related to two country 
attributes:  elasticity of demand and the government’s welfare-orientation.  While we have argued that 
landlocked countries tend to have a lower elasticity of demand for certain services, we cannot rule out 
the  possibility  that  the  fact  of  being  landlocked  per  se  affects  market  structure  and  performance 
independently of policy.  Therefore, in our search for a suitable instrument for policy, we focus on the 
government’s welfare-orientation.  The inclination of policy makers to favor vested interests at the 
expense of public welfare is constrained by the extent to which policy makers will be held accountable 
for their decisions.  In short, political institutions that shape governance and democracy appear to be an 
important factor when policy makers decide on the level of openness.
22  This suggests a strategy for 
addressing the endogeneity problem using a measure of pre-determined political institutions.   
We use the Polity IV Project’s political regime indicator to instrument for potentially endogenous trade 
restrictiveness.  Ranging from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic), the Polity IV score 
summarizes the opportunities available to citizens to express their preferences over alternative policies 
and leaders, the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of power by the executive 
branch, and the guarantee of civil liberties in acts of political participation.
23  This indicator appears to be 
a suitable instrument for the purposes at hand because it can be treated as exogenous to our outcome 
measures of interest and, most importantly, overall democratic accountability is not likely to have a 
direct effect on market structure and performance other than through the choice of regulatory 
measures.
24   
Empirical evidence provides support for the two -step process by which prevailing political institutions 
matter for the government’s ‘welfare-mindedness’, i.e. its relative valuation of public welfare versus 
rents, and how this measure of welfare valuation affects the choice of services policies.  With regard to 
the  first  step,  Mitra,  Thomakos  and  Ulubaşoğlu  (2002)  estimate  the  Grossman-Helpman  model  for 
                                                           
21  Dihel and Shepherd (2007) show how policy barriers inflate firms’ price-cost margins.  E.g. for commercial presence in fixed 
line telecom, these estimates mostly range between 50-130% while the tax equivalents for the mobile segment in mode 3 are 
mostly in the single-digit range. 
22  Gasmi, Noumba Um and Recuero Virto (2009) find that in developing countries the quality of the political process has a 
favorable impact on performance in the telecom industry, though their measure of ‘accountability’ captures institutions ranging 
from corruption to currency risk and is thus not directly comparable to our notion of this term.  Gual and Trillas’s (2006) search 
for determinants of telecom policy is inconclusive; they find that entry barriers are mainly a function of the inherited legal 
system while the other institutional variables are insignificant.  In addition the size of the incumbent telecom firm, supposedly 
reflecting its political clout, is positively associated with the decision to create an independent regulator, a fact the authors 
themselves call ‘surprising.’ (p.263). 
23  Gasmi and Recuero Virto (2010) report that a prior change in the democracy variable over time is negatively related to 
competition in the fixed line and mobile sectors, respectively, which is tantamount to an improvement in democracy being 
associated with fewer telecom operators.  No rationale is offered for this result. 
24  The idea that a country’s political institutions limit policy-makers’ susceptibility to lobbying efforts applies to every sector.  
Thus we employ the same accountability indicator to instrument for our measure of policy restrictiveness in telecom and 
transport, respectively. 14 
 
Turkey at four different points in time over the period 1983 to 1990, during which Turkey transitioned 
from a dictatorship to a democracy, thereby offering an opportunity to observe the same country’s 
political economy forces at work under two different institutional settings.  Reassuringly, Mitra et al. 
find the government’s weight on welfare to be generally higher for the democratic regime as compared 
to dictatorship.   
Figure 2 
 
For the second conceptual step that links welfare valuation to policy choices, we draw on Gawande, 
Krishna and Olarreaga’s (2009) study estimating government’s welfare-mindedness for a broad cross-
section of countries to show that policy openness increases the more governments care about public 
welfare.    Using  their  estimates
25, Figure 2 presents an integrated pictu re of the political economy 
mechanism at work.  To the left the horizontal axis is increasing in democratic accountability and to the 
right the horizontal axis is increasing in overall policy restrictiveness whereas the vertical axis in the 
middle measures governments’ relative welfare weight.  Because a country’s institutional setup is pre-
determined,  reading  this  graph  from  left  to  right  illustrates  the  systematic  relationship  between 
institutions and the choice of policies.  In a nutshell, for the roughly 50 countries for which all the 
requisite data are available, there is evidence of a positive relationship between institutions and welfare 
                                                           
25  We are able to match 49 countries, i.e. about half of our sample, to the data set of Gawande, Krishna and Olarreaga (2009) 
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weight such that more democratic countries put larger weight on social welfare, and evidence of a 
positive relationship between welfare weight and openness.
26   
There is thus  a theoretical basis as well as empirical evidence to support the notion that a country’s 
political  institutions  affect  market  outcomes  through  trade  policy  choices.    We  can  be  reasonably 
confident that such institutions do not have a direct effect on market structure and performance.  We 
cannot, however, exclude the possibility that the political regime indicator may affect the outcome 
variables of interest through other channels, for instance through its influence on domestic regulation.  
We plan to explore ways of capturing relevant aspects of domestic regulation in future work, even 
though the validity of the exclusion restriction will still have to be assumed.     
 
4.2  Telecommunications 
In the absence of an established unified estimation framework for such diverse variables as market 
structure and connectivity (in both telecom and transport sectors), we estimate a non-structural linear 
model  for  each  outcome  variable  of  interest.    Across  our  analyses  we  will  consider  a  core  set  of 
covariates as fundamental determinants of market structure and connectivity, which reflect a country’s 
attractiveness to investors in telecom and transport services sectors.  These variables include GDP, GDP 
per capita, the percentage of urban population and population density.  We also include a dummy 
variable for landlocked and for African countries, respectively, thus accounting for geography.  The 
Africa dummy is important to ensure that results regarding policy choices are not driven solely by this 
region:  not only are 9 of the 22 landlocked countries in our sample located in Africa, but some parts of 
Africa may also be especially vulnerable to governance problems.  All these determinants are closely 
related  to  gravity  model  variables  that  are  known  to  affect  goods  trade  flows.    In  addition,  the 
distribution and ‘lumpiness’ of demand, as proxied by the two population variables, is important in 
services sectors because the fixed (often sunk) costs of sizable investments in both telecommunications 
and transport must be covered by sufficiently high (localized) demand. 
We start by looking at market structure in telecommunications, using data on the Herfindahl index (HHI) 
of market concentration in the fixed line and mobile segment.
27  The model including individual policy 
measures or the restrictiveness index (STRI) to be estimated is given by 
i i i i i Geography ls Fundamenta Policy HHI           3 2 1 0  
   
                                                           
26  The Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the institutions and the welfare variable is +0.56 whereas the correlation 
between the welfare and the policy variable (STRI) is –0.40, both highly significant.  The first-stage estimation results of policy 
restrictiveness on political accountability are presented in Annex A.1. 
27  We compute the HHI based on TeleGeography’s GlobalComms database as the sum of squared market shares of all firms in a 
market.  A taxonomy commonly used by competition authorities would call a market with HHI < 1,000 “unconcentrated”, 1,000 
≤ HHI < 1,800 “moderately concentrated”, and with HHI ≥ 1,800 “concentrated”.  In the latter case a market is usually no longer 
assumed to be competitive.  A value of 10,000 would indicate a monopoly. 16 
 
Table 1:  Fixed Line Telecommunications Market Structure 
 
The specific variables and the results are displayed in    
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)   
                              OLS             OLS              IV             OLS             OLS              IV   
Log GDP (2007)          -743.4872***    -798.2878***    -809.0922***    -375.9854***    -430.3521***    -434.3159***
                       (144.0017)      (133.2533)      (144.2164)      (108.2153)      (116.0360)      (113.7538)   
Log GDP p.c. (2007)      337.5251        408.2233        594.7895*       453.5335**      583.2758***     658.5521***
                       (290.1874)      (261.1358)      (309.7016)      (173.6483)      (182.1849)      (184.0177)   
Urban population (% of total)      -4.6006         -4.2191        -10.0375         -3.3924         -6.7183         -7.4386   
                        (13.5589)       (14.1653)       (15.8076)        (8.1750)        (8.6059)        (9.6040)   
Population Density (people/sqkm)      -0.4287         -0.2019         -0.7863         -0.1279         -0.3848         -0.5329   
                         (0.8240)        (0.6933)        (0.9776)        (0.4793)        (0.5504)        (0.6303)   
LLC Dummy              -1209.7363***    -728.4651      -1042.8145**      281.7894        -10.0693       -101.0782   
                       (455.2252)      (465.9156)      (495.3117)      (336.2588)      (377.2240)      (389.1188)   
Africa Dummy             851.3010        909.5038*       741.3573        674.7607*       632.0786        434.1480   
                       (553.7653)      (526.0141)      (572.6307)      (398.9616)      (438.5653)      (504.4995)   
License Limit           1636.2611***                                     494.1309                                   
                       (454.2623)                                      (408.7319)                                   
Public Lic Criteria     -948.1628*                                     -2543.2939***                                
                       (485.0377)                                      (810.1150)                                   
Foreign Ownership Limit     -15.1185*                                       -15.4296**                                 
                         (7.6787)                                        (6.7105)                                   
Indep Regulator          552.6018                                       -125.5950                                   
                       (477.1015)                                      (335.9401)                                   
STRI Fixed Line                         1338.7055**     3787.6651***                                                
                                       (564.5126)       (1.4e+03)                                                   
STRI Mobile                                                                             2830.4262***    4434.4475***
                                                                                       (798.9577)       (1.6e+03)   
Constant               10423.0639***    8018.9008***    6199.9453***    6154.8811***    1099.5716        165.6405   
                        (1.9e+03)       (1.8e+03)       (2.2e+03)       (1.5e+03)       (1.5e+03)       (1.7e+03)   
Obs                           101             103             103             100             103             103   
Log L                   -899.7253       -922.0859       -928.9106       -850.1660       -886.8009       -890.2658   
R-sq                       0.4240          0.3598          0.2691          0.5019          0.3649          0.3207   
H0: exogenous reg                                          0.0379                                          0.2638   
H0: under-ident                                            0.0029                                          0.0098   
Kleibergen-Paap F                                         17.4368                                         10.3548   
Dependent variable: Hirschman concentration index in fixed and mobile market
Excluded instruments: p4_polity2
Fixed line Mobile17 
 
Table 1.  Policy variables are first treated as exogenous (columns labeled ‘OLS’) and then, following the 
previous section’s discussion, we instrument for the STRI with the Polity IV variable in columns labeled 
`IV’.
28  Before summarizing a country’s policies in a single index (see section 2.2 on quantification), we 
explore directly the effects of individual elements of policy.  The relatively small sample size does not 
allow us to identify separately the effects of the entire range of policy measures.  We therefore focus on 
four aspects of the regulatory regime, identified as salient in discussions with industry stakeholders and 
regulators: the existence of a limit on the number of licenses awarded, the public availability of licensing 
criteria, the maximum equity share permitted to be held by foreign investors, and the existence of a 
regulatory authority that is independent of the sector ministry. 
The main result is a significant and quantitatively important effect of services policy restrictiveness, 
suggesting that—conditional on relevant country characteristics—less open countries are on average 
characterized by a more concentrated market structure.  The policy effect remains strong and significant 
even after controlling for African and landlocked countries.
29  Once we account for the endogeneity of 
policy choices (columns 3 and 6), the unbiased impact of restrictive policies on market conc entration is 
even larger in magnitude.
30   
Based on the presumption that  concentrated markets (and the associated rents) tend to perpetuate 
restrictive policies, we would expect  the OLS coefficient  to  be biased  upward  compared to the IV 
estimate.   Yet we find that instrumenting raises the  magnitude of the  positive coefficient.  One 
explanation could be that the STRI variable is afflicted with measurement error.
31  The ‘classical errors-
in-variables’ assumption implies the well-known attenuation bias, leading to a downward bias if the OLS 
coefficient is positive (and an upward bias if it happens to be negative as is the case in other models 
further below).  Even though the STRI score captures the latent concept of policy restrictiveness only 
imperfectly, note that the IV estimator will remedy both problems.  Specifically, as long as the excluded 
                                                           
28  Based on its constituent elements, the Polity IV score seems to come closest to capturing the institutional arrangements that 
are relevant for shaping trade policies.  To check robustness, we have run the same analyses with other indicators measuring 
institutions, namely the EIU’s democracy index, the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, and the score of political 
freedom from Freedom House.  All these variables are highly correlated (the Polity and EIU score 0.84, Polity and WGI 
accountability 0.83, Polity and Freedom House 0.84), thus employing either one of those indicators delivers qualitatively similar 
results. 
29  We always present robust standard errors which, in addition, include a correction for small sample size.  The findings are 
therefore designed to provide a conservative lower bound, in spite of the larger standard errors associated with two-stage IV 
estimation. 
30  The IV estimation’s first-stage regression results are presented in Annex 1.  The coefficient on the excluded instrument, the 
Polity IV score, is highly significant at the 1% level and carries a negative sign, confirming that countries with more democratic 
institutions tend to employ more liberal policies (low STRI values).  In those first-stage regressions, Shea’s (1997) partial R
2 with 
respect to the Polity IV score equals 22 percent.  We are therefore confident that we have a strong and relevant instrument. 
31  The phenomenon of OLS and IV coefficients diverging in an unexpected way has been a persistent feature in the literature 
on returns to education/schooling; see Card (2001) for an in-depth treatment of potential explanations.  Among these, 
measurement error is likely to be an important problem when studying trade policy openness.  We do not exclude the 
possibility, for instance, that underlying heterogeneity in treatment effects also plays a part in explaining the wedge, such that 
countries differ in the way trade restrictiveness affects their market structure or outcome, and that political institutions 
constrain some countries more than others.  However, the data do not allow us to explore these aspects further. 18 
 
instrument  is  uncorrelated  with  the  measurement  error,  the  IV  procedure  will  remove  both  the 
endogeneity and the attenuation bias.  Since those effects are biasing the OLS estimate in opposite 
directions, it is quite conceivable for IV estimates to increase once the attenuation bias is removed. 
In terms of individual policies, the existence of a license limit has a strong effect on fixed line operators 
and results in an average increase in market concentration by 1,636 index points.  Transparency about 
the licensing process and the criteria applied work to reduce concentration, and the same is true with 
respect to more liberal ownership rules.  Overall, when all these (and more) policies are encapsulated in 
a single index, a more restrictive policy stance—reflected in a higher STRI score—is associated with a 
significantly higher market concentration.  Since fixed line policy is most likely not exogenous  with 
respect to market structure (p-value = .0379), we interpret the STRI coefficient from column 3 to find 
that a change in the index score by 25 points (which corresponds to one increment) would on average 
be associated with a market that is less concentrated by about 947 HHI points.  This effect is quite 
sizable.  The presence of a quota-like limit on licenses would ceteris paribus change a country’s STRI by 
50 points, which corresponds to a higher market concentration by 1,894 index points; this is the same 
order of magnitude as the effect inferred from the model in column 1. 
Apart from the main variables of interest, we also see that larger countries are characterized by lower 
concentration; presumably because larger economies can sustain more operators.
32  Similar findings 
emerge from the mobile telecommunications market, except that here transparency of licensing criteria 
turns out to be more important than license limits.  This result is not surprising since the availability of 
radio  spectrum  imposes  in  principle  exogenous  limits  on  t he  number  of  mobile  providers,  and 
telecommunication authorities have often used discretion to set licensing conditions rather than explicit 
license limits.   
The effect of restrictive telecom policies on the sector’s market structure is robust to other measures as 
well.  In the  Annex we present estimation results on how restrictive policies affect the number of 
telecom  operators  active  in  a  country,  which  yield  qualitatively  the  same  results.    Likewise,  more 
restrictive policies are also associated with a significantly higher market share of the largest provider in a 
given country, both in the fixed line and the mobile market.   
Next we turn to an analysis of access to telecom services, for which we look at the number of telephone 
main lines per hundred inhabitants (in fixed line) and the number of cellular subscriptions per hundred 
inhabitants (in mobile).  Estimating performance in the telecom sector follows the approach taken in 
Fink et al. (2003), Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) and Ros (1999).  We include the familiar set of covariates 
controlling for market attractiveness.  In addition, the observed market structure—itself a result of 
policy’s first-round impact on entry decisions—can be expected to influence performance.  Therefore, in 
this performance specification we also include, for each segment, the residual from the previous market 
                                                           
32  This is confirmed by estimating the determinants of the number of operators with a Poisson model, the results of which can 
be found in the Annex. 19 
 
structure estimation, i.e. that part of market structure that is left unexplained by policy and  other 
covariates, and estimate the following equation.  
  i i i i i i e Structure Market Geography ls Fundamenta STRI Service Telecom to Access             4 3 2 1 0 log  
 
Table 2 presents the results for the mobile and fixed telecom sector, respectively.  Columns 1/2 and 4/5 
estimate an exogenous policy model, first by representing stages of restrictiveness by a set of dummy 
variables and second by treating the STRI as a continuous variable.
33  Columns 3/6 then apply a two-step 
IV procedure to the STRI variable.  In general the results show a significant negative impact of restrictive 
policies on a country’s teledensity.  Using an instrument is essential to obtain unbiased results, for 
reasons of endogeneity and measurement error, even though the substantially larger standard errors 
associated with IV estimation render the mobile STRI coefficient insignificant as compared to OLS.  
Table 2:  Cellular Subscriptions 
                                                           
33  Employing a set of dummy variables to represent policy relaxes the assumption that there is one linear partial effect of policy 
that is uniform across all values of restrictiveness, which is assumed when the STRI score is treated as a continuous variable. 20 
 
 
Estimation results for the fixed line market (columns 1-3) show that the effect of policies on teledensity 
is not as strong as on cellular subscriptions, in terms of both magnitude and significance of coefficients.  
It appears, though, that conditional on size and per capita income, both of which are strong predictors 
of teledensity, countries with moderate restrictions (STRI = 25) have lower accessibility to landlines.  
When policies are considered one by one, it is again the prohibition of VoIP and operation of own 
international gateways that stifles access to mainlines (see Annex Table A.3).  Once accounting for policy 
endogeneity, though, the adverse effect of the fixed line STRI is significant at the 5% level (column 3).  
The  coefficient  estimate  suggests  that  liberalizing  policies  by  one  index  increment,  which  would 
correspond to a change from the 75
th percentile (STRI = 75) to the median (STRI = 50), would on average 
be associated with an increase in mainlines by 4 percentage points. 
Looking at the results for the mobile segment in Table 2, we find all four dummy variables negative and 
significant,  i.e.  conditional  on  market  structure,  progressively  higher  levels  of  restrictiveness  are 
associated with fewer numbers of cellular subscriptions.  The mobile STRI in column 5 also exhibits a 
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)   
                            F-OLS           F-OLS            F-IV           M-OLS           M-OLS            M-IV   
Log GDP (2007)             2.4746***       2.3557***       2.4097***      -2.1839         -2.2545         -2.2555   
                         (0.6573)        (0.6778)        (0.6719)        (1.5264)        (1.4774)        (1.4775)   
Log GDP p.c. (2007)        9.6955***      10.0248***       9.0947***      23.0129***      24.1328***      24.1509***
                         (1.7905)        (1.8087)        (1.7524)        (2.9013)        (2.6189)        (2.7118)   
Urban population (% of total)       0.0085         -0.0024          0.0267          0.1778          0.1558          0.1556   
                         (0.0647)        (0.0714)        (0.0799)        (0.1331)        (0.1372)        (0.1379)   
Population Density (people/sqkm)       0.0032          0.0052          0.0082**        0.0072          0.0072          0.0071   
                         (0.0035)        (0.0038)        (0.0038)        (0.0121)        (0.0120)        (0.0120)   
Africa Dummy               3.4644          2.5261          3.3690          0.0528         -0.4793         -0.5268   
                         (2.7466)        (2.8603)        (3.0360)        (4.9500)        (4.6949)        (5.0101)   
LLC Dummy                  2.3882          4.6915*         6.3080**       -2.0470         -0.4325         -0.4543   
                         (2.4563)        (2.3725)        (2.9229)        (3.9509)        (4.1121)        (4.2005)   
Log HHI residual           0.0002         -0.0001         -0.0007         -0.0041***      -0.0036**       -0.0036** 
                         (0.0004)        (0.0005)        (0.0006)        (0.0015)        (0.0015)        (0.0016)   
STRI = 0.25           -5.5564**                                      -12.9708**                                 
                         (2.4903)                                        (5.6347)                                   
STRI = 0.50           -1.1689                                        -16.2788***                                
                         (2.5797)                                        (5.5890)                                   
STRI = 0.75            2.5276                                        -28.9742***                                
                         (8.2894)                                       (10.4050)                                   
STRI = 1.00           -5.7834                                        -17.3247**                                 
                         (4.5554)                                        (8.3479)                                   
STRI Fixed Line                           -4.0226        -16.4599**                                                 
                                         (4.0397)        (7.8692)                                                   
STRI Mobile                                                                              -27.9711***     -27.5863   
                                                                                         (7.8014)       (18.7148)   
Constant                 -77.6332***     -80.8423***     -71.7368***    -124.8579***    -135.9442***    -136.1684***
                        (13.7494)       (13.2233)       (13.0698)       (22.2814)       (19.7363)       (21.7501)   
Obs                      102.0000        102.0000        102.0000        102.0000        102.0000        102.0000   
Log L                   -369.6457       -372.6347       -378.8429       -436.8189       -438.2601       -438.2612   
R-sq                       0.7233          0.7066          0.6686          0.7941          0.7881          0.7881   
H0: exogenous reg                                          0.0439                                          0.9821   
H0: under-ident                                            0.0012                                          0.0118   
Kleibergen-Paap F                                         24.0848                                         10.1268   
Dependent variable: Number of mainlines/cellular subscriptions per 100 people
Excluded instruments: p4_polity221 
 
highly  negative  effect.    This  result  suggests  that  liberalizing  policies  equivalent  to  one  incremental 
change in the telecom STRI, e.g. an easing of foreign equity limitations from 49 to 70 percent so as to 
lower  the  STRI  score  from  50  to  25,  would  on  average  be  associated  with  an  increase  in  cellular 
subscriptions  by  7  percentage  points.
34  In terms of individual policy measures, the measure of 
prohibiting VoIP routing and operation of international   gateways by foreign providers has a strong 
negative impact, as have equity limits on acquiring public enterprises, while publicly available licensing 
criteria is associated with higher levels per capita subscriptions.  The latter finding relates to the positive 
effect of transparency already found in the mobile segment’s market structure model.
35 
Apart from the strong effect of policies, market structure in the mobile sector also affects performance 
in a way we would expect.  In particular, across all three specifications, a more concentrated market 
(higher Herfindahl index) is associated with fewer cellular subscriptions per capita.  This is the part of 
cross-country variation in market concentration that is not already explained by policy and the set of 
usual covariates, all of which are also in the performance equation.  Amongst the other covariates, in 
the mobile market the effect of income per capita trumps any other variable such as size, geography or 
population.  
In the fixed line segment it is likewise true that larger and richer countries have more mainlines per 
capita,  as  should  be  expected.    In  addition,  there  is  some  evidence  that  more  densely  populated 
countries have on average better access.  There is also a minor positive effect of landlocked countries, 
which is best understood as conditional on size and income.  Since many landlocked countries are small 
and poor, this effect indicates that access to telephone mainlines in these countries is on average not as 
low as would be predicted based on other covariates. 
As was previously the case in the market structure regressions, measurement error appears to be a 
pervasive phenomenon afflicting the coefficient on policy restrictiveness.  If we presume, however, that 
the measurement error is roughly the same for the fixed line and mobile STRI, then the comparison of 
OLS and IV coefficients in the two markets would imply that reverse causality is stronger in the mobile 
segment than in fixed line (because it fully offsets the attenuation bias in Table 2).  This is somewhat 
surprising; the more concentrated market structure in the fixed line sector could have pointed at this 
sector being better ‘organized.’  In any case the results underscore the adverse effect of more restrictive 
policies on accessibility in both markets. 
 
4.3  Transportation 
                                                           
34  The array of STRI dummy variables suggest, though, that the effect might not be linear; in particular, moving from the 75th 
percentile to the median, and from the 25th percentile to fully open policies, is each associated with an increase of about 12 
percentage points in coverage, whereas the partial effect of reducing restrictions from ‘major’ (STRI = 50) to ‘minor’ (STRI = 25), 
respectively, raises cellular subscriptions by 3.3 percentage points. 
35 It has proved difficult, though, to include several policy measures simultaneously, which appears to be a problem of 
insufficient degrees of freedom; estimation results are presented in Annex Table A.4.   22 
 
Let us now turn to connectivity in the air transportation sector.  The number of international flights 
(both inbound and outbound) as well as total seat capacity serve as indicators for how well a country is 
connected in terms of air transport.  We continue to use the core set of gravity-type variables that 
determine a market’s attractiveness to foreign providers, in this case airlines.  GDP as a measure of 
economic size will control for the scale effect inherent in both variables.  In the following analysis we 
limit our attention to air passenger transportation
36 but we note that approximately fifty percent of 
global airborne cargo is transported in the belly of passenger  aircraft.  The results in this section may 
therefore assume some significance beyond the narrowly defined air passenger sector  (see also World 
Bank 2009).   
Air passenger transport services are almost exclusively traded on a cross-border basis, for airlines do not 
need to establish a commercial presence in order to  fly  to  a specific  country.  While a national 
investment regime, i.e. a set of rules for FDI in the airline sector, does exist, the key policy instruments 
are Bilateral Air Service Agreements (BASAs) which stipulate conditions under which international flights 
might be provided between the two contracting parties.
 37  We will return to the type and scope of BASA 
provisions in greater detail below.  It is clear, though, that due to the predominance of cross-border 
trade in air services the number of airlines established in a country is not a meaningful metric of market 
structure; airlines would rather compete for providing flights between specific country pairs, or even 
between cities, i.e. competition on a route-specific basis.  We therefore focus directly on the impact of 
air transport policies on the availability of air transport services, for which the number of airlines flying 
to a given country matters as well.
38  
Information on the number of airlines, the number of international flights, and available seat kilometers 
for each country are obtained  from Air Transport Intelligence ’s  (ATI)  Flight  Global  database.    We 
consider the total number of international flights (or, alternatively, the total seat capacity of such flights) 
as the dependent variable. In addition to the core set of gravity-type variables already introduced, the 
provision of flights is innately linked to two additional characteristics.  From a supply side perspective, 
airport infrastructure matters and is, at least in the short run, exogenous to the number of flights.  
Second, from the demand side, a country’s attractiveness to tourism is an important determinant of 
                                                           
36  The chief reason is data availability, both in terms of policies that specifically apply to air cargo transportation as well as 
cargo volume, some of which travels as belly cargo in scheduled passenger flights and some on dedicated cargo flights.  One 
would need to concord the fraction of belly cargo to the corresponding BASA provisions applicable to passenger traffic, and the 
remainder to specific provisions governing dedicated cargo traffic, which may be scheduled or charter flights.  Current data 
availability does not allow for this matching. 
37  As has been explained in section 2.3 above, the provisions of a country’s national investment regime in the air transport 
sector may have little bearing on openness, for the privileges it affords will interact, and often be superseded, by whatever 
rights and obligations are stipulated by the relevant BASA. 
38  We regard the evidence of policy impact on air movements offered in this paper as complementary to related work that has 
studied the effect of aviation policies on bilateral goods trade flows.  For example, Geloso Grosso (2008), Piermartini and 
Rousova (2008), and Geloso Grosso and Shepherd (2010) have directly included the ALI in the trade cost function of gravity 
model of goods trade. 23 
 
flights and seats offered.  Therefore, we also control for the number of airports with a paved runway per 
country and for tourist arrivals as a share of domestic population.
39   
In terms of policies affecting air connectivity, the appropriate measure of policy restrictiveness needs to 
take into account both air traffic rights and foreign investment rules.  The former is summarized by the 
WTO’s Air Liberalization Index (ALI) whereas information on the latter comes from the World Bank’s 
newly developed policy database (see footnote 5 above on the construction of the combined STRI).  We 
estimate the following model: 
i i i i i i i Geography ls Fundamenta Tourism Infrastr STRI Flights of No Log               5 4 3 2 1 0 ) . (  
 
Table 3 presents results for the number of flights per country.  Column 1 includes a set of dummy 
variables for countries with intermediate and highly restrictive policies, whereas column 2 treats the 
STRI as a continuous, exogenous variable.  Column 3 then instruments for policies with institutional 
accountability in the same way as in the previous section (the IV estimation’s first-stage regression 
results are presented in Annex 2). 
We find again that policy choices matter for air transport connectivity.  Across 100 countries, policies 
restricting the cross-border trade of air passenger transport services as well as the establishment of 
commercial presence are associated with significantly fewer flights offered to and from such countries.
40  
Based on the estimated coefficient from the air passenger STRI in column 2, liberalizing aviation policies 
such that the index score falls from 50 to 25 is associated with a 20 percent increase in the number of 
flights.
41  Looking at the set of conditioning variables, attractiveness as a tourist destination, economic 
size and income per capita all exert a positive and significant effect of flights, as expected.  Overall the 
model fits the data very well, explaining about 86 percent of the cross -country variation in the number 
of international flights.  When we instrument for  aviation policies with institutional accountability, the 
magnitude of the coefficient on policy increases substantially.   The partial effect of liberalization , as 
inferred from the model in column 3, such that the index score falls from 50 to 25  would increase the 
total number of flights by some 42 percent.   
The same qualitative results obtain when we look at total seat capacity rather than flights.  These 
estimations are therefore not shown to conserve space but are available upon request.  In both cases—
                                                           
39  For instance, Dresner et al. (2002) show that constrained access to gates may constitute a barrier to entry (and increase the 
cost of airline service for incumbents).  Similarly, Brueckner (2002) uses a Cournot duopoly model to show how incumbent 
duopolists may restrict runway capacity such that no third party can enter the market.  These studies strongly suggest that 
airport infrastructure matters. 
40  The results are robust to alternative weights with which the cross-border and commercial presence part are combined in the 
STRI; specifically, the ALI component (i.e. BASA provisions) may assume any weight in the 60-90% band without materially 
affecting the results. 
41  Following the log-linear functional form, exp{(-.70)(-.25)} = 1.1912. 24 
 
number of flights and seat capacity as dependent variables—the results are robust to using the ALI alone 
as a measure of policy openness.   
Table 3:  Air Transport Performance  
 
 
In Table 3, the number of flights is an ‘absolute’ measure of connectivity in that it is not scale-invariant 
(the same is true for total seat capacity).  As such, a given number of flights, say 400, could be the result 
of 40 airlines offering 10 flights each or a single airline only offering 400 flights, or of course anything in 
between these two polar cases.  In analogy to the trade in goods literature, in which a distinction is 
commonly made between ‘trade in more product categories’ and ‘more trade of a given product,’ we 
may think of more airlines serving a country as the ‘extensive margin’ and of the number of flights per 
airline as the ‘intensive margin.’  We are interested in the relevant margin of adjustment, i.e. whether 
aviation policies primarily affect the number of airlines, the frequency of flights, or both.  Individual 
                              (1)             (2)             (3)   
                          OLS-STRI         OLS-STRI          IV-STRI   
Log GDP (2007)             0.5804***       0.5903***       0.6033***
                         (0.0381)        (0.0393)        (0.0460)   
Log GDP p.c. (2007)        0.2824**        0.2757**        0.2510** 
                         (0.1255)        (0.1224)        (0.1233)   
Urban population (% of total)      -0.0056         -0.0056         -0.0063   
                         (0.0049)        (0.0049)        (0.0053)   
Population Density (people/sqkm)      -0.0000         -0.0001         -0.0001   
                         (0.0003)        (0.0003)        (0.0002)   
Percent Tourists/Population       0.3151**        0.3282**        0.3313** 
                         (0.1359)        (0.1325)        (0.1321)   
LLC Dummy                 -0.1526         -0.1657         -0.1075   
                         (0.1602)        (0.1585)        (0.1655)   
Africa Dummy               0.1004          0.0885          0.1161   
                         (0.1666)        (0.1673)        (0.1702)   
airports paved runways       0.0000          0.0000          0.0000   
                         (0.0001)        (0.0001)        (0.0001)   
STRI intermed             -0.1486                                   
                         (0.1319)                                   
STRI high                 -0.4234***                                
                         (0.1317)                                   
STRI AirPass M0                           -0.7003**       -1.4157*  
                                         (0.2738)        (0.8168)   
Constant                   5.8828***       5.9809***       6.4229***
                         (0.9141)        (0.8780)        (0.9164)   
Obs                      100.0000        100.0000        100.0000   
Log L                    -77.0324        -77.9991        -80.9988   
R-sq                       0.8634          0.8607          0.8521   
H0: exogenous reg                                          0.3097   
H0: under-ident                                            0.0039   
Kleibergen-Paap F                                         11.8571   
Dependent variable: Log Total Number of Flights
Excluded instruments: p4_polity2 25 
 
BASA provisions may either primarily affect the number of airlines or the frequency and/or size of 
carriers’ operations,  respectively.
42  On  the one  hand,  air  traffic  rights,  in  particular  5
th  and  higher 
freedom rights, as well as the type of designation and withholding clauses likely affect the number of 
airlines being able (or willing) to service a country.  On the other hand, the range of provisions relating 
to airfares, number of flights per route and maximum seat capacity directly affect the frequency and 
capacity of flights for a given (designated) airline. 
In order to disentangle the channel through which aviation rules affect air connectivity, we split the total 
number of flights (F) into the average number of flights per airline (F/A) and the number of airlines (A), 
which allows us to study the intensive and extensive margin separately.  We take advantage of the 
property of OLS estimation that under these circumstances, the estimated coefficients on the policy 
variable in the flights-per-airline and in the number-of-airline estimations will exactly add up to the 
policy coefficient in the total number of flights regression.  This allows for a convenient decomposition 
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Table 4 presents the decomposition results; the first three columns refer to OLS estimations assuming 
the STRI is an exogenous variable whereas the last three columns employ IV estimation.  Looking at the 
STRI coefficients, it is evident that aviation policies affect predominantly the average number of flights 
per airline.  Looking at the column (2), the effect of policy is highly significant at the 1 percent level and 
increasing in magnitude as restrictiveness moves from an intermediate to a high level.  The partial effect 
of an intermediate STRI value is a reduction in the number of flights per airline by 25 percent, whereas 
highly restrictive polices reduce flights per airline by another 14 percent, i.e. by almost 40 percent 
compared to the references point of liberal policies.
43  The decomposition thus reveals that the number 
of flights per airline is the primary margin of adjustment in response to restrictive aviation policies. 
Apart from the main findings pertaining to policy, results for other covariates are also of interest.  For 
instance, and unlike aviation policies, tourist attractiveness increases the number of flights mainly 
through more airlines (two-thirds of the effect) and only to a smaller but still significant extent through 
more flights.  Given that  different airlines bring in tourists from their national markets, this result and 
the relative size of both margins is quite pl ausible.    Likewise,  a  country’s  ‘absorptive  capacity’  as 
                                                           
42  Bilateral Air Service Agreements contain four principal areas of provisions that regulate the possibility and the extent of 
bilateral flight connections: (1) traffic rights, (2) ownership rules, (3) fares/tariffs, and (4) capacity.  For a comprehensive 
overview of regulatory aspects of the air transport services sector, and how the restrictiveness of market access provisions is 
quantified in the QUASAR database, see WTO document S/C/W/270/Add.1, Volume I, of November 2006.  A detailed exposition 
of the ‘Freedoms of the Skies’ can be found on page I.15. 
43  Using the coefficient estimates of column (2), one obtains exp{-.2907} – 1 = -0.2523 and exp{-.4941} – 1 = -0.3899, 
respectively, the difference of which is -0.1376. 26 
 
measured by airports with paved runways affects the number of flights per airline rather than the 
number of airlines. 
The findings in Table 4 suggest that the adverse impact on air transport connectivity is mainly driven by 
BASA provisions that affect frequency and capacity of air traffic, e.g. designation clauses, weekly flight 
limitations, and perhaps also traffic rights.  A more detailed analysis of the differential impact of various 
BASA provisions is data demanding and is beyond the scope of the present paper.  We leave this task for 
future research.  
 
Table 4:  Air Transport Performance – Number of Flights, Flights per Airline, and Number of Airlines 
 
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)             (6)   
                       F-STRI    F/A-STRI      A-STRI       F-STRI     F/A-STRI       A-STRI   
Log GDP (2007)             0.5804***       0.2000***       0.3804***       0.6033***       0.2208***       0.3825***
                         (0.0381)        (0.0328)        (0.0346)        (0.0460)        (0.0346)        (0.0355)   
Log GDP p.c. (2007)        0.2824**        0.2427***       0.0397          0.2510**        0.2178***       0.0332   
                         (0.1255)        (0.0723)        (0.0866)        (0.1233)        (0.0756)        (0.0826)   
Urban population (% of total)      -0.0056         -0.0039         -0.0017         -0.0063         -0.0044         -0.0020   
                         (0.0049)        (0.0030)        (0.0033)        (0.0053)        (0.0033)        (0.0033)   
Population Density (people/sqkm)      -0.0000         -0.0001          0.0000         -0.0001         -0.0001          0.0000   
                         (0.0003)        (0.0002)        (0.0003)        (0.0002)        (0.0002)        (0.0003)   
Percent Tourists/Population       0.3151**        0.1126*         0.2026*         0.3313**        0.1113**        0.2200** 
                         (0.1359)        (0.0570)        (0.1042)        (0.1321)        (0.0546)        (0.1012)   
LLC Dummy                 -0.1526          0.0443         -0.1967         -0.1075          0.0927         -0.2001   
                         (0.1602)        (0.1269)        (0.1590)        (0.1655)        (0.1269)        (0.1738)   
Africa Dummy               0.1004          0.2669*        -0.1667          0.1161          0.2607*        -0.1448   
                         (0.1666)        (0.1468)        (0.1771)        (0.1702)        (0.1525)        (0.1795)   
airports paved runways       0.0000          0.0001**       -0.0001          0.0000          0.0001**       -0.0001   
                         (0.0001)        (0.0000)        (0.0000)        (0.0001)        (0.0000)        (0.0000)   
STRI intermed             -0.1486         -0.2907***       0.1420                                                   
                         (0.1319)        (0.0961)        (0.1127)                                                   
STRI high                 -0.4234***      -0.4941***       0.0707                                                   
                         (0.1317)        (0.1106)        (0.1346)                                                   
STRI AirPass M0                                                           -1.4157*        -1.3665**       -0.0494   
                                                                         (0.8168)        (0.6279)        (0.5799)   
Constant                   5.8828***       4.6283***       1.2547*         6.4229***       5.0128***       1.4104** 
                         (0.9141)        (0.5329)        (0.6592)        (0.9164)        (0.5996)        (0.6581)   
Obs                      100.0000        100.0000        100.0000        100.0000        100.0000        100.0000   
Log L                    -77.0324        -43.2276        -60.6725        -80.9988        -48.3405        -61.6434   
R-sq                       0.8634          0.7180          0.7466          0.8521          0.6877          0.7416   
Dependent variable: flights
Excluded instruments: p4_polity2 
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5.  Conclusions and policy implications 
Drawing on a new dataset of applied policies affecting services trade, we are able to isolate the effect of 
regulatory policies on market structure and performance from other country characteristics.  Our results 
illustrate that a country’s own policy reform can also contribute to a more competitive market structure, 
and  improved  access  to  telecommunications  and  air  transport  services.  We  find  that  in  the 
telecommunications sector, liberalizing policies from the level of the median country (STRI = 50) to the 
level of first quartile (STRI = 25) would on average result in an increase of cellular subscriptions by 7 
percentage  points  and  an  increase  in  mainlines  by  4  percentage  points.  Within  the  STRI  scoring 
framework applied in this paper, such a step could for instance be achieved by increasing the maximum 
foreign capital participation limit from a minority to a majority stake.  In the air transport sector, a 
reform of aviation policies with similar impact, such that the STRI score would fall from 50 to 25, is 
estimated to be associated with a 20 percent increase in the number of flights.  The effect of aviation 
policies works mainly through reducing the average number of flights per airline, rather than reducing 
the number of airlines flying to and from a country.  Countries with highly restrictive aviation policies 
have on average 39 percent fewer flights per airline than liberal countries. 
The importance of services policies for market structure and performance has two implications for 
policy-making.  First, international assistance for transport and telecommunications infrastructure needs 
to  be  complemented  by  policy  reform.    Second,  in  transport  services,  there  is  a  strong  case  for 
multilateral negotiations because there are limits to what unilateral reform can achieve.  We address 
each aspect in turn.   
Our results suggest that access to key “linking” services is determined not only by the state of infra-
structure (see Portugal-Perez and Wilson 2008; Francois and Manchin 2007) but also by competitive 
pressure in those sectors.  However, current trade facilitation and trade-related aid have placed a heavy 
emphasis on infrastructure projects, especially so in transportation but also in telecommunication.  Also, 
studies  which  evaluate the  effectiveness  of  aid  for  trade  (see  e.g.  Cali  and Te  Velde  2010)  do  not 
explicitly specify the role of restrictive policies as alternative constraints to trade performance. Our 
findings indicate that international assistance for infrastructure investment is likely to earn a low return 
where policies restrict competition between service providers. 
Apart from policy reform within a country, progress in transport liberalization requires stronger inter-
national cooperation.  The reason is that a particularly country, say Zambia, is limited in what it can 
achieve on its own in the air transport sector because introducing competition on any international 
route requires the consent of other countries involved.  Borchert et al. (2011) show that air transport 
services  are  also  restricted  in  other  developing  and  industrial  countries,  many  of  which  are  either 
important  destination  and  source  countries,  or  transit  or  hub  countries  for  connecting  flights  to 
landlocked economies.   
Engaging in international negotiations on services sector liberalization is important for at least two 
reasons.  Even though the mercantilistic ‘quid pro quo’ logic may not be particularly suited to services 28 
 
negotiations,  regional  or  multilateral  negotiations  with  strong  demandeurs  may  sometimes  help 
overcome entrenched domestic interests, as the example of Costa Rica shows, which opened one of its 
most sensitive services sectors (telecommunications) under the auspices of the CAFTA-DR agreement 
(Robert and Stephenson 2008).  Secondly, the beneficial effect on landlocked countries’ connectivity of 
policy reforms in other (transit or final destination) countries constitutes a positive externality that is 
unlikely to be fully internalized by policy makers in those partner countries.  This externality could be 
addressed  in  international  negotiations.    The  WTO  would  be  a  natural  platform  for  multilateral 
negotiations but its contribution to liberalizing the transport sector has so far been limited.  Air traffic 
rights are explicitly excluded from the scope of services negotiations, and maritime transport has never 
been seriously negotiated.  In the Uruguay Round many countries, including OECD countries, did not 
make full commitments on cross-border road and rail transport services.  Regional agreements like the 
Yamoussoukro Decision, which entered into force in 2000, also offer scope for regional policy reform but 
they have, however, so far seen only limited implementation. 
Transport and telecommunications services are critical to a country’s overall economic performance.  
Connectivity requires good infrastructure, an appropriate policy regime, and international regulatory 
cooperation.  Our paper suggests that international assistance for infrastructure investment needs to be 
complemented by national and multilateral reform in order to yield full benefits.  To insist on such 
reform as a condition for assistance is now anathema.  At the same time, participative mechanisms are 
noticeably  short on  reform  proposals  and  long  on  lists  of  required  investments.    Perhaps  the  way 
forward  is  to  ask  countries  to  present  proposals  that  specify  both  intended  reforms  and  required 
investments, and to allocate assistance competitively to maximize the expected social rate of return. 29 
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Annex 1:  Intermediate steps in oligopoly model 
A.1  Derivation of the first-order condition 
Let us first derive how optimal firm output, q*(n), responds to changes in n which active providers take 
as fixed.  Based on a provider’s first-order condition (see Assumption A4), we may assert 
          
                  
                                   
 
          
                 
                                   
 
As in Zhao (2009), in order to simplify notation it will be convenient to define 
                        
 
                       
where both inequalities follow from Assumptions (A2) and (A3), respectively.  Substituting back we see 
that in the decentralized equilibrium firm output falls when more providers are allowed to enter the 
market, whereas aggregate output increases with n. 
          
  
        
              
  
        
 
Now rearranging the first-order condition  
                                                                          
and making use of the of the terms introduced above to eliminate        yields the optimality condition 
for the number of firms 
             
  
            
   
     
    
   
 
             
 
A.1  Properties of the factor        
Differentiating the factor       , which inflates the wedge between price and average cost, with respect 
to the demand elasticity yields 
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Since   is negative (subject to Assumption A5(ii)), this expression shows that, holding governments 
welfare mindedness fixed, the factor        will be higher in countries in which the demand for the 
service under consideration is less elastic.  In turn, the larger the wedge between price and the 
bracketed function involving average cost, the smaller the optimal number of providers as implicitly 
defined by the optimality above.   
Again, in the special case of equal weights given to consumer surplus and profits, the effect exerted by 
the demand elasticity vanishes (and   certainly does not vary with ε).  Since there is no particular reason 
to believe that this case accurately represents reality, the generalization proposed here may be useful 
for empirical work. 
Differentiating        with respect to the government’s welfare mindedness yields 
        
  
                     
The second expression illustrates that, for any given demand elasticity, governments oriented more 
towards public welfare, i.e. those that do not place as high a relative weight on profits, will see the 
factor        shrink towards unity and thus admit a higher number of providers.  
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Annex 2:  Additional estimation results 
A.2.1  Instrumental variables estimation first-stage results 
 
 
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)   
                     STRI Fixed Line    STRI Fixed Line     STRI Mobile     STRI Mobile   
Log GDP (2007)             0.0068          0.0021          0.0040          0.0008   
                         (0.0191)        (0.0193)        (0.0173)        (0.0174)   
Log GDP p.c. (2007)       -0.0311         -0.0663         -0.0183         -0.0405   
                         (0.0363)        (0.0463)        (0.0363)        (0.0427)   
Urban population (% of total)       0.0019          0.0024          0.0002          0.0006   
                         (0.0016)        (0.0017)        (0.0014)        (0.0014)   
Population Density (people/sqkm)       0.0001          0.0001          0.0000         -0.0000   
                         (0.0002)        (0.0001)        (0.0001)        (0.0001)   
LLC Dummy                  0.1027          0.0976          0.0405          0.0305   
                         (0.0780)        (0.0822)        (0.0617)        (0.0640)   
Africa Dummy               0.1358          0.1165          0.1659**        0.1629*  
                         (0.0923)        (0.0948)        (0.0803)        (0.0833)   
Polity IV Index           -0.0240***      -0.0365***      -0.0152***      -0.0222***
                         (0.0057)        (0.0100)        (0.0047)        (0.0079)   
EIU Demo Score                             0.0490                          0.0298   
                                         (0.0323)                        (0.0256)   
Constant                   0.4742*         0.5577*         0.4121          0.4596*  
                         (0.2721)        (0.2940)        (0.2498)        (0.2636)   
Obs                      103.0000         99.0000        103.0000        100.0000   
Log L                     -4.4725         -4.8630         19.4451         18.4263   
R-sq                       0.3223          0.3328          0.3031          0.3031   
First-stage results (dependent variable: HHI)
                    
                     STRI AirPass M0   
Log GDP (2007)             0.0165   
                         (0.0153)   
Log GDP p.c. (2007)       -0.0105   
                         (0.0262)   
Urban population (% of total)      -0.0012   
                         (0.0011)   
Population Density (people/sqkm)       0.0000   
                         (0.0001)   
Percent Tourists/Population      -0.0076   
                         (0.0205)   
LLC Dummy                  0.0625   
                         (0.0490)   
Africa Dummy               0.0721   
                         (0.0595)   
airports paved runways      -0.0000   
                         (0.0000)   
Polity IV Index           -0.0113***
                         (0.0033)   
Constant                   0.4787** 
                         (0.1979)   
Obs                      100.0000   
Log L                     34.1924   
R-sq                       0.2489   
First-stage results (dep var: total number of flights)35 
 
A.2.2  Telecom Market Structure – Number of Operators 
As an alternative measure of market structure, we also study the cross-country distribution of the 
number of telecom operators.  Since the number of operators is a strictly positive count variable (with 
most of its mass at values of 1 to 3 and a maximum at 10), it is not well represented by a linear 
framework.  Thus we model it as a Poisson process and use a zero-truncated Poisson estimator for the 
specification treating the STRI variable as exogenous (columns 1-2), and then instrument for the STRI 
with the Polity IV variable using an IV Poisson estimator (column 3).  The main finding, discussed in 
section 4.1, of higher restrictiveness being associated with a less competitive market structure is robust 
to using the number of operators as dependent variable in both telecom markets.   
Table A.1:  Telecommunications market structure: number of operators, fixed line market 
                              (1)             (2)             (3)   
                            F-ZTP           F-ZTP           F-PIV   
Number fixed operators                                                
Log GDP (2007)             0.3743***       0.3634***       0.3210***
                         (0.0600)        (0.0522)        (0.0467)   
Log GDP p.c. (2007)       -0.2758**       -0.2326**       -0.2119***
                         (0.1214)        (0.1131)        (0.0677)   
Urban population (% of total)       0.0041          0.0045          0.0029   
                         (0.0047)        (0.0050)        (0.0038)   
Population Density (people/sqkm)       0.0009*         0.0006          0.0007*  
                         (0.0005)        (0.0005)        (0.0004)   
LLC Dummy                  0.3134          0.1715          0.2943** 
                         (0.2042)        (0.2193)        (0.1223)   
Africa Dummy              -1.0241***      -1.0058**       -0.2512   
                         (0.3762)        (0.4068)        (0.1627)   
License Limit             -0.8177**                                 
                         (0.3914)                                   
Public Licensing Criteria       0.6561                                   
                         (0.4128)                                   
Foreign Ownership Limit       0.0047                                   
                         (0.0054)                                   
Independent Regulator       0.0253                                   
                         (0.2081)                                   
STRI Fixed Line                           -0.5764         -1.2620***
                                         (0.3955)        (0.3468)   
Constant                   0.0409          0.8759          1.3323** 
                         (0.8060)        (0.8209)        (0.5225)   
Obs                      101.0000        103.0000        103.0000   
Log L                   -140.1808       -147.4328                   
Pseudo R-sq                0.2905          0.2634                   
Dependent variable: number of telecom operators
Excluded instruments: p4_polity2  36 
 
Table A.2:  Telecommunications market structure: number of operators, mobile market 
                              (1)             (2)             (3)   
                            M-ZTP           M-ZTP           M-PIV   
Number mobile operators                                                
Log GDP (2007)             0.2369***       0.2355***       0.2035***
                         (0.0345)        (0.0384)        (0.0284)   
Log GDP p.c. (2007)       -0.2029***      -0.2292***      -0.1941***
                         (0.0514)        (0.0534)        (0.0387)   
Urban population (% of total)       0.0011          0.0018          0.0011   
                         (0.0027)        (0.0026)        (0.0021)   
Population Density (people/sqkm)       0.0000          0.0000          0.0001   
                         (0.0001)        (0.0001)        (0.0001)   
LLC Dummy                 -0.0485          0.0164          0.0234   
                         (0.0952)        (0.0908)        (0.0831)   
Africa Dummy              -0.1836         -0.2072         -0.1290   
                         (0.1228)        (0.1298)        (0.1035)   
License Limit             -0.0077                                   
                         (0.1251)                                   
Public Licensing Criteria       0.4195                                   
                         (0.2756)                                   
Foreign Ownership Limit       0.0045*                                  
                         (0.0028)                                   
Independent Regulator       0.0729                                   
                         (0.0903)                                   
STRI Mobile                               -0.5690**       -0.7526*  
                                         (0.2261)        (0.3908)   
Constant                   1.0012**        2.1844***       2.1565***
                         (0.4978)        (0.4062)        (0.3460)   
Obs                      100.0000        103.0000        103.0000   
Log L                   -168.7668       -175.0526                   
Pseudo R-sq                0.1391          0.1280                   
Dependent variable: number of telecom operators
Excluded instruments: p4_polity2  37 
 
Table A.3:  Telecommunications teledensity 
 
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)   
                            F-OLS           F-OLS           F-OLS           F-OLS           F-OLS   
Log GDP (2007)             2.0357***       2.3389***       2.3435***       2.2461***       2.1543***
                         (0.6580)        (0.6841)        (0.7112)        (0.6813)        (0.6710)   
Log GDP p.c. (2007)       10.4809***      10.1666***      10.3549***      10.2758***       9.9810***
                         (1.6516)        (1.7899)        (1.7671)        (1.7730)        (1.6394)   
Urban population (% of total)       0.0214         -0.0063         -0.0146         -0.0111          0.0360   
                         (0.0672)        (0.0711)        (0.0696)        (0.0709)        (0.0679)   
Population Density (people/sqkm)       0.0049          0.0046          0.0041          0.0046          0.0055   
                         (0.0039)        (0.0038)        (0.0038)        (0.0038)        (0.0035)   
Africa Dummy               3.2275          2.1954          2.1372          2.2543          3.2486   
                         (2.9383)        (2.8856)        (3.0004)        (3.0790)        (3.1012)   
LLC Dummy                  5.2806**        4.0740*         3.8753          4.3053*         5.1857*  
                         (2.3718)        (2.2487)        (2.3840)        (2.4200)        (2.8143)   
Log HHI residual           0.0001          0.0001          0.0001          0.0001         -0.0000   
                         (0.0004)        (0.0004)        (0.0005)        (0.0005)        (0.0005)   
VoIP/IG not allowed       -5.8151*                                                        -6.1347*  
                         (3.1381)                                                        (3.6374)   
Minority stake publ                       -1.2816                                         -0.9387   
                                         (2.1592)                                        (2.1883)   
License Limit                                              1.0414                          0.8410   
                                                         (3.8328)                        (3.3491)   
Public Licensing Criteria                                                       2.6978         -3.2170   
                                                                         (3.2487)        (4.2084)   
Independent Regulator                                                                       2.9457   
                                                                                         (1.9913)   
Constant                 -85.5945***     -82.2732***     -83.9176***     -85.3157***     -81.6715***
                        (12.3430)       (12.9483)       (12.8869)       (12.7560)       (13.1324)   
Obs                       98.0000        102.0000        101.0000        100.0000         97.0000   
Log L                   -355.0599       -373.1268       -370.0877       -366.5046       -350.9366   
R-sq                       0.7249          0.7037          0.6997          0.7005          0.7288   
Dependent variable: Number of mainlines/cellular subscriptions per 100 people38 
 
Table A.4:  Telecommunications cellular subscriptions per hundred people 
 
 
   
                              (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)             (5)   
                            M-OLS           M-OLS           M-OLS           M-OLS           M-OLS   
Log GDP (2007)            -2.5614*        -2.5522*        -2.6259*        -2.6756*        -2.8138*  
                         (1.4972)        (1.4072)        (1.5230)        (1.5144)        (1.5597)   
Log GDP p.c. (2007)       25.4453***      24.5318***      25.5349***      25.4823***      24.4109***
                         (2.6757)        (2.7566)        (2.9678)        (2.7830)        (2.6785)   
Urban population (% of total)       0.1297          0.1959          0.1283          0.1171          0.1722   
                         (0.1426)        (0.1407)        (0.1501)        (0.1420)        (0.1451)   
Population Density (people/sqkm)       0.0062          0.0063          0.0035          0.0031          0.0062   
                         (0.0105)        (0.0116)        (0.0105)        (0.0109)        (0.0119)   
Africa Dummy              -4.7465         -4.6610         -3.7420         -4.5563         -5.8182   
                         (4.8912)        (4.5889)        (4.7865)        (5.2421)        (4.9394)   
LLC Dummy                 -0.1133         -2.7555         -1.0930         -1.3938         -0.3004   
                         (4.5384)        (4.3037)        (4.5809)        (4.8433)        (4.6098)   
Log HHI residual          -0.0027         -0.0028**       -0.0028*        -0.0017         -0.0027*  
                         (0.0017)        (0.0014)        (0.0017)        (0.0016)        (0.0015)   
VoIP/IG not allowed      -11.5082**                                                       -6.2002   
                         (4.7472)                                                        (4.9653)   
Minority stake publ                      -12.9983***                                     -11.2175** 
                                         (4.2341)                                        (4.9144)   
License Limit                                             -4.8368                         -0.0339   
                                                         (4.6228)                        (4.1854)   
Public Licensing Criteria                                                      14.4144**        4.4386   
                                                                         (6.8861)        (7.4526)   
Independent Regulator                                                                       1.8224   
                                                                                         (4.6506)   
Constant                -149.0247***    -142.0864***    -149.8065***    -162.1428***    -143.3345***
                        (19.5466)       (20.1769)       (21.3301)       (21.3525)       (21.3576)   
Obs                       99.0000        102.0000        101.0000         99.0000         97.0000   
Log L                   -429.3130       -438.3440       -439.0172       -429.7485       -417.0405   
R-sq                       0.7692          0.7878          0.7650          0.7665          0.7844   
Dependent variable: Number of mainlines/cellular subscriptions per 100 people39 
 
Annex 3:  Data sources and description  
The following data series are obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 2010 database of 
the World Bank: GDP, GDP per capita, percentage of urban population, total population, land area, the 
number of airports with a paved runway, and number of international tourist arrivals.  GDP is measured 
in US dollars at constant prices in billions for the year 2007, GDP per capita is measured in thousands of 
constant 2005 international dollars adjusted for purchasing power parity.  Population density is obtained 
by dividing the population by land area; it is measured in millions of people per square kilometer.  The 
relative measure of tourist attractiveness is calculated as international tourist arrivals as a percentage of 
domestic population. 
Data for telecom market structure are based on the number of active operators and their market shares 
in  the  fixed  line  and  mobile  segment,  respectively,  as  reported  in  TeleGeography’s  GlobalComms 
database.  Telecom performance indicators – fixed line per 100 inhabitants, mobile subscription per 100 
inhabitants are taken from the ITU (2009), which reports information for 2007.  
The number of airlines providing international flights (both inbound and outbound), the total number of 
flights, total seat capacity and available seat kilometers are obtained from Air Transport Intelligence’s 
(ATI) Flightglobal database.  
 
 